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I. INTRODUCTION
When successive interests are created in property, the transferor
expects that the property will be enjoyed by one or more persons for a
period of time and then, at the expiration of that time, enjoyed by one
or more other persons. For example, when 0 conveys Blackacre "to A
for life, then to B," O's intent is for B to get possession of Blackacre at
A's death. Contrary to O's expectations, however, it is possible for B's
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A. 1968, Ohio State
University; J.D. 1975, Ohio State University. The author would like to thank Lawrence
Waggoner for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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remainder to be accelerated, giving B possession prior to A's death.'
This could happen if A conveyed his life estate to B, or if A disclaimed
or released his life estate.
2
Because most future interests today are equitable interests in fi-
nancial assets, many acceleration cases involve the issue of trust termi-
nation.3 For example, if 0 conveys $100,000 "to T in trust to invest for
the benefit of A for life, then to corpus B" and then A disclaims, re-
leases, or conveys his interest to B, B may ask that the trust be termi-
nated by accelerating the remainder and distributing the trust prop-
erty to him. 4 B's claim is supported by the generally prevailing rule
that a trust may be terminated if all the beneficiaries consent, unless
termination would defeat a material purpose of the trust.
5
This Article focuses on the potential for abuse by the life tenant
who may be able to alter the identity of the remaindermen by a dis-
claimer, release, or conveyance.' This is unfair to the remaindermen
who lose their chance of taking. It also defeats the intent of the donor.
The traditional judicial approach in acceleration cases does not recog-
nize these manipulative situations, and the problem has been exacer-
bated both by the widespread adoption of disclaimer statutes1 and by
the position taken in the recently promulgated Restatement (Second)
of Property.8 This Article discusses the case law on acceleration and
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1, 26.2 (1988); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 231-233 (1936); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.43 (1952); W. BOWE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 47.45 (1962); 5 A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 412.1 (4th ed. 1989); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§
791-804 (2d ed. 1956); Annotation, Relinquishment of Interest by Life Beneficiary in
Possession as Accelerating Remainder of Which There is Substitutional Gift in Case
Primary Remainderman Does Not Survive Life Beneficiary, 7 A.L.R.4TH 1084 (1981).
2. Although contrary to O's expectations, B's earlier possession of Blackacre does
not necessarily defeat O's overall intent under the circumstances.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 78-93.
4. If A has not disclaimed, released, or conveyed his interest to B, then A and B
could request termination. For a discussion of trust termination cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 78-93.
5. This is known as the Claflin Doctrine, from Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20
N.E. 454 (1889). See P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION 222-32
(1987).
6. The issue of the acceleration of remainders may arise in the context of convey-
ances and devises of both real and personal property. It also may arise with respect to
both legal interests and interests created in trusts. The remainder may be vested or con-
tingent and may be to a class or to one or more individuals.
7. The disclaimer statutes typically provide that the property passes as if the dis-
claimant either predeceased the testator (in the case of a will) or died before the time of
the conveyance (in the case of an inter vivos transfer). See infra note 16.
8. Comments and illustrations to § 26.1 and § 26.2 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY (1988) indicate that it treats a release like a disclaimer because the prop-
erty passes as if the releasor predeceased the testator. See infra text accompanying note
[Vol. 42
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ACCELERATION OF REMAINDERS
offers a suggestion for reform that will reduce the potential for abuse
by the life tenant.
The potential for manipulation exists when the identity of the re-
maindermen can change during the course of the prior estate. This is
the case, for example, when 0 conveys "to A for life, then to A's chil-
dren, the issue of any deceased child to take the parent's share."9 A's
children are sometimes called the primary remaindermen and A's
grandchildren the alternative or substitutional remaindermen. If A dis-
claims and if the remainder is accelerated, giving A's then-living chil-
dren indefeasible interests, the identity of the remaindermen becomes
fixed. Had there been no renunciation, one or more children of A might
have predeceased A, resulting in the substitution of their issue as re-
maindermen. In trust termination cases, courts have been inconsistent
about whether the potential for the change in identity of the remain-
dermen constitutes a material purpose that would be defeated by
termination. 10
At times acceleration and indefeasibility may even be contrary to
the disclaimant's intent. For example, suppose T devises property "to
A for life, then to A's children." A may have one young child and A
may be planning to have more children. A may also have tax reasons
for wanting to disclaim the life estate. But if A disclaims, and the dis-
claimer statute provides that the property passes as if the disclaimant
predeceased T, this will have the effect of accelerating the remainder
and closing the class of A's children. This could be contrary not only to
T's intent but to A's as well.
The traditional judicial approach presumes acceleration absent
contrary intent.' Of course, the difficult issue is what constitutes con-
trary intent, and it is not easy to reconcile the cases. Courts sometimes
find contrary intent in language that is included in the instrument for
reasons that have nothing to do with acceleration. Most courts do not
find contrary intent, however, and they frequently state that no inde-
pendent purpose exists for postponing the estate other than to provide
for the life tenant, and therefore, the remainder should be accelerated
when the life tenant renounces.
2
90.
9. For the sake of brevity, "to T in trust to invest for the benefit of A" occasion-
ally will be omitted from the hypotheticals in this Article. The issues of acceleration and
the identity of the remaindermen exist for both legal and equitable interests.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
11. See 0. BROWDER & L. WAGGONER, FAMILY PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: FUTURE IN-
TERESTS 72 (3d ed. 1980).
12. E.g., Danz v. Danz, 373 Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940); Simpkins v. Simpkins,
131 N.J. Eq. 227, 24 A.2d 821 (1942); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N.C.
166, 84 S.E.2d 642 (1954); Union Nat'l Bank v. Easterby, 236 N.C. 599, 73 S.E.2d 541
1991)
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Supported by both the first Restatement of Property and the Re-
statement (Second) of Property, the traditional approach also
presumes indefeasibility as a consequence of acceleration. However, in-
defeasibility is not an inevitable result of acceleration. A remainder can
accelerate and remain defeasible or partially defeasible. 13 Furthermore,
indefeasibility, rather than acceleration itself, is what allows the life
tenant to manipulate the remainder. The cases that purport to object
to acceleration, upon closer examination, really object to indefeasibil-
ity. In fact, some of the cases that expressly deny acceleration are in
fact accelerating by giving the income to the remaindermen while re-
taining defeasibility so that the identity of the remaindermen can
change until the death of the life tenant."' These courts are under the
misapprehension that they are denying acceleration, mistakenly equat-
ing acceleration with an outright distribution of corpus.
Disclaimer statutes 5 may be determinative on the issue of acceler-
ation because they often provide that the property passes as if the dis-
claimant predeceased the testator or transferor. 1 Such a provision
(1952); Clark v. Board of Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. 1980); Auerbach v. Samuels, 9
Utah 2d 261, 342 P.2d 879 (1959); In re Estate of Reynolds, 39 Wis. 2d 155, 158 N.W.2d
328 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923); Askey v. Askey,
111 Neb. 406, 196 N.W. 891 (1923).
14. See, e.g., Pate v. Ford, 293 S.C. 268, 360 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 297
S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
15. Most states have disclaimer statutes. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 123 (4th ed. 1990).
16. Section 2-801(d) of the Uniform Probate Code provides:
(d) The effects of a disclaimer are:
(1) If property or an interest therein devolves to a disclaimant
under a testamentary instrument, under a power of appointment exer-
cised by a testamentary instrument, or under the laws of intestacy, and
the decedent has not provided for another disposition of that interest,
should it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed or failed interests in general,
the disclaimed interest devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased
the decedent, but if by law or under the testamentary instrument the
descendants of the disclaimant would take the disclaimant's share by
representation were the disclaimant to predecease the decedent, then
the disclaimed interest passes by representation to the descendants of
the disclaimant who survive the decedent. A future interest that takes
effect in possession or enjoyment after the termination of the estate or
interest disclaimed takes effect as if the disclaimant had predeceased
the decedent. A disclaimer relates back for all purposes to the date of
death of the decedent.
(2) If property or an interest therein devolves to a disclaimant
under a nontestamentary instrument or contract and the instrument or
contract does not provide for another disposition of that interest, should
it be disclaimed, or of disclaimed or failed interests in general, the dis-
claimed interest devolves as if the disclaimant had predeceased the ef-
[Vol. 42
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/2
ACCELERATION OF REMAINDERS
mandates acceleration and indefeasibility, which in turn, creates the
potential for manipulation.17 The drafters of the disclaimer statutes
probably did not anticipate this problem, but rather were concerned
with providing for an unambiguous distribution of the disclaimed
property.
Release, on the other hand, is not governed by the disclaimer stat-
ute, and this creates the potential for different results under similar
circumstances. Similarly, a conveyance by the life tenant to the re-
maindermen does not invoke the disclaimer statute. It is easier for
courts to prevent manipulation, and hence easier to effectuate intent,
when there is a release or a conveyance rather than a disclaimer be-
cause the inflexible disclaimer statute does not govern. However, the
Restatement (Second) of Property deviates from the majority view by
treating release cases like disclaimer cases, thus increasing the oppor-
fective date of the instrument or contract, but if by law or under the
nontestamentary instrument or contract the descendants of the disclai-
mant would take the disclaimant's share by representation were the dis-
claimant to predecease the effective date of the instrument, then the
disclaimed interest passes by representation to the descendants of the
disclaimant who survive the effective date of the instrument. A dis-
claimer relates back for all purposes to that date. A future interest that
takes effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of the
disclaimed interest takes effect as if the disclaimant had died before the
effective date of the instrument or contract that transferred the dis-
claimed interest.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d), 8 U.L.A. 167 (1983 & 1990 Supp.).
17. Acceleration can be avoided in the context of a disclaimer when the disposition
provision of the disclaimer statute is never invoked. For example, in Stewart v. Johnson,
88 N.C. App. 277, 362 S.E.2d 849 (1987), cert. denied, 323 N.C. 179, 373 S.E.2d 124
(1988), T devised property to his son Charles for life, then to Charles's children, and if
Charles died without children, to Charles's brothers and sisters. Charles renounced. He
had no children. The court denied acceleration because the remaindermen could not be
identified. Id. at 279, 362 S.E.2d at 851. The court ignored N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31B-3(a)
which provides that the property devolves as if the renouncer predeceased the decedent.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31B-3(a)(1989).
The court suggested that § 31B-1(b), which prohibits someone from taking more
than the disclaimant's share, also prevented acceleration. It is doubtful that the legisla-
ture intended the section cited by the court to prevent acceleration. Its purpose is proba-
bly to prevent the following: T dies intestate survived by a child, A, and a grandchild, G,
who is the child of a deceased child of T. A has four children, B, C, D, and E. A dis-
claims. Without N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31B-1(b) the property arguably would be distributed
as follows: 1/5 each to B, C, D, E, and G, giving A the power to funnel 4/5 of the estate
into his branch of the family because of North Carolina's per-capita-at-each-generation
system. Because of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31B-1(b), if A disclaims, the property should be
distributed: 1/8 each to B, C, D, and E and 1/2 to G. Another way to read the statute
results in the following distribution: 1/10 each to B, C, D, and E, and 6/10 to G. (The
property renounced passes from the decedent as if the renouncer predeceased.) See Mis-
enheimer v. Misenheimer, 312 N.C. 692, 325 S.E.2d 195 (1985) (Exun, J., dissenting).
1991]
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tunities for manipulation.18
This Article first discusses a recent case which illustrates the po-
tential for manipulation. Then it discusses some preliminary matters,
such as the case law's position on the relevance of the classification of
the future interest to the issue of acceleration, and the difference be-
tween disclaimer and release. The spousal dissent cases, a sub-category
of disclaimer cases, are treated separately. This is followed by an ex-
planation of why the objection should be to indefeasibility rather than
acceleration. The article then explores the relationship of the accelera-
tion issue to the old destructibility rule. Finally, the Article examines
trust termination cases, which involve trust law doctrine not found in
other acceleration cases. The summary and conclusion offer some sug-
gestions for reform that will reduce the potential for abuse.
II. AN ILLUSTRATION
A recent South Carolina case dramatically illustrates the potential
for abuse. In Pate v. Ford,"9 T devised one-third of her estate to her
son Billy for life, then to her grandchildren; one-third to her son Wal-
lace for life, then to her grandchildren; and one-third outright to her
grandchildren. At T's death, Wallace had five children and Billy had
none. Wallace disclaimed his life estate. If disclaimer triggered acceler-
ation, Wallace would in effect guarantee for his five children a posses-
sory and indefeasible interest in the one-third. 20 Their interest in this
portion of T's estate would not be diminished by any afterborn child-
ren of Wallace or Billy.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the remainder
would not be accelerated because that would destroy the rights of un-
born grandchildren. 21 Wallace argued that the disclaimer statute man-
dated acceleration because it provided that the disclaimant is deemed
to predecease T. However, the Court of Appeals said that T had pro-
18. See infra text accompanying note 91.
19. 293 S.C. 268, 360 S.E.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d
775 (1989).
20. Of course, they already have a possessory and indefeasible interest in the one-
third interest that they were devised outright.
21. Although the court of appeals expressly denied acceleration, its real objection
was to indefeasibility. The court decided that the income from the trust created by Wal-
lace's disclaimer should go to whomever happened to be the remaindermen at the time
income is distributed. This arguably is acceleration because the remaindermen, who orig-
inally owned a future interest, are given the income interest during the life of the disclai-
mant, which is a present interest. The court assumed that acceleration also meant inde-
feasibility and thus expressly denied acceleration. But giving the income to the
remaindermen, while letting their identity change from time to time, is acceleration with
the retention of defeasibility. See infra text accompanying note 56.
[Vol. 42
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vided for distribution at Wallace's death, which constituted an "other-
wise provided" clause that the disclaimer statute excepted. Although
the result prevented the life tenant from manipulating the identity of
the remaindermen in a way that could be contrary to T's intent, the
court's interpretation nullified that provision of the statute because
there will always be a provision for distribution that differs from distri-
bution upon acceleration.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed 22 and held
that the disclaimer statute's distribution provision resulted in accelera-
tion. The supreme court rejected the lower court's holding that "on
Wallace's death" constituted "another disposition" within the meaning
of the disclaimer statute's exception to its distribution provision.23 The
court relied on the first Restatement of Property, which provides: "A
construction that the 'terms and circumstances of the limitation, mani-
fest a contrary intent' is not justified solely by the fact that after limit-
ing a life interest (the renounced interest) it is provided that the gift
over shall take effect 'at the death' of the life tenant .... ,24
This decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court represents a
trend to accelerate remainders under the authority of the disclaimer
statute in a situation in which the life tenant may be manipulating the
identity of the remaindermen contrary to the testator's intent.25
III. SOME PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The Relevance of Classification
The acceleration issue can arise with any kind of future interest."
The classification of the future interest should not determine the accel-
eration issue, however, because the classification depends upon the
often fortuitous choice of words that usually does not reflect the trans-
feror's intent about acceleration.
Nonetheless, courts occasionally find the classification determina-
tive. For example, in Blackwood v. Blackwood,27 T devised all of his
22. Pate v. Ford, 297 S.C. 294, 376 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
23. Id. at 298, 376 S.E.2d at 777.
24. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 231 comment j (1936).
25. The disposition in Pate was unusual. The potential for Wallace's manipulation
arose because the remainder interest in Wallace's one-third went to T's grandchildren
instead of to Wallace's descendants by representation. Most trusts still alter the identity
of the remaindermen, but only within their own descending line.
26. Future interests subject to acceleration include indefeasibly vested remainders,
vested remainders subject to open, vested remainders subject to complete divestment,
contingent remainders, and executory interests.
27. 237 N.C. 726, 76 S.E.2d 122 (1953).
1991]
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property to his wife in fee simple so long as she remained his widow,
and if she remarried, to his living children or heirs of those children
who died leaving children.2 8 T's wife renounced her interest. The court
treated acceleration as dependent solely on whether the successive in-
terests were a life estate and remainder or a defeasible fee and an exec-
utory interest. The court construed the language as a grant of a life
estate. Thus, the remainder accelerated and became indefeasible. The
court did not explain, however, why an executory interest following a
defeasible fee would not accelerate. The court also did not express con-
cern that the identity of the remaindermen might have changed if
there had been no acceleration.
2 9
Usually the classification issue involves the age-old contingent-ver-
sus-vested debate. Traditionally, a number of legal consequences have
turned on whether a remainder is contingent or vested subject to di-
vestment. The deciding factor is the verbal formula used: If the condi-
tion is stated in precedent form, the remainder is contingent; if it is
stated in subsequent form, it is vested subject to divestment. These
two classifications of future interests are illustrated as follows: "To A
for life, then to A's surviving descendants" and "to A for life, then to
A's children, if any child of A predeceases A, to his or her surviving
descendants." Substantively, these two conveyances say the same thing
but because of the way they are worded, the first example is a contin-
gent remainder and the second example is a vested remainder subject
to divestment.
Several cases seem to allow determination of the acceleration issue
to turn on this artificial distinction. In Keen v. Brooks,30 T devised the
remainder to (his) grandchildren A and B, and if either A or B died
without issue, to the survivor, and if either died with issue, the issue
would take the parent's share per stirpes. The life tenant renounced
and the court held that the remainder accelerated and became indefea-
sible in A and B. The court stated that the alternative gifts were "sub-
stitutional, and could hardly be construed as conditions precedent."'"
In In re Fischer32 the court held that remainders contingent upon sur-
vival could not be accelerated because they were contingent.
3 3
28. Id. at 727, 76 S.E.2d at 122-23.
29. This would happen if one of T's children predeceased his wife.
30. 186 Md. 543, 47 A.2d 67 (1946).
31. Id. at 548, 47 A.2d at 70.
32. 307 N.Y. 149, 120 N.E.2d 688 (1954).
33. See also Danz v. Danz, 373 Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940) (renunciation of life
estate by widow accelerated remainders, which were deemed to be vested remainders
subject to divestment rather than contingent remainders); Simpkins v. Simpkins, 131
N.J. Eq. 227, 24 A.2d 821 (1942) (acceleration allowed upon relinquishment of precedent
life estate; legacy presumed vested rather than contingent); Central Nat'l Bank v. Eells,
[Vol. 42
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The above cases illustrate the condition most frequently attached
to remainders, namely, that the remaindermen survive the life tenant,
whether it is stated in condition precedent or condition subsequent
form. The form used should not determine the acceleration issue, but
the cited cases hold that acceleration results if survival is stated in
condition subsequent form. If stated in condition precedent form, ac-
celeration may, but probably will not result.
The Restatement of Property is not entirely clear in its treatment
of the acceleration of contingent remainders. It provides that "a suc-
ceeding interest is not accelerated so long as a condition precedent to
such succeeding interest continues unfulfilled."'" But a comment fur-
ther explains:
Thus a description of the persons to take after the attempted prior
interest as the "then surviving descendants" of a named person or as
"such children of (a named person) as are then living" is not necessa-
rily sufficient to create the condition precedent which is required for
the operation of the rule stated in this section. In resolving this pre-
liminary problem of construction, the criterion is whether the terms
and circumstances of the limitation manifest an intent to benefit per-
sons living at the termination of the preceding interest or at the death
of the person to whom such preceding interest was limited. 5
The Restatement's criterion is not very helpful because the "terms and
circumstances"36 of the limitation do not manifest an intent one way or
the other when there is no information other than a remainder to the
life tenant's surviving children.
Courts have come out both ways on whether a remainder can be
accelerated if it is contingent upon surviving the life tenant. This is
probably based in part on the Restatement's unclear rule. Some courts
have rationalized acceleration by construing the language to require
survival of the life tenancy rather than the person to whom the life
estate was given.37 Thus, the remaindermen who are living when the
life estate is renounced would be entitled to an indefeasibly vested in-
terest because they survived the life tenancy. Other courts have viewed
the renunciation by the life tenant as equivalent to his or her death.38
These rationales are appropriate for both the vested-subject-to-divest-
5 Ohio Misc. 187, 215 N.E.2d 77 (1965) (renunciation of a prior interest by a beneficiary
accelerates succeeding vested remainders subject to divestment, unless terms and cir-
cumstances of the limitation manifest a contrary intent on the part of the testator).
34. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 233 (1936).
35. Id. § 233 comment c.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539, 543, 166 P.2d 417, 421 (1946).
38. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N.C. 166, 169, 84 S.E.2d 642,
644 (1954); In re Estate of Reynolds, 39 Wis. 2d 155, 159, 158 N.W.2d 328, 329 (1968).
1991]
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ment form of remainder and for the contingent form.
If the condition precedent is independent of the life estate, the
remainder generally will not be accelerated when the life estate is re-
nounced if the condition has not been fulfilled.39 For example, if T de-
vises property "to A for life, then to B if B graduates from college,"
and A disclaims, the remainder will not be accelerated if B has not yet
graduated from college.
B. Disclaimer versus Release
Most acceleration cases arise because a life tenant has released or
disclaimed her interest.40 A disclaimer (or renunciation) 41 is a refusal to
accept the benefit of an interest with the result that, by operation of
law, the property passes to someone else rather than passing to some-
one chosen by the disclaimant.4 2 The transfer runs from the original
transferor or testator, rather than from the disclaimant, to the one who
takes as a result of the disclaimer.
A release, in contrast, is a beneficiary's refusal to continue ac-
cepting the benefits of the interest after having already accepted some
benefits. It constitutes a transfer from the releasor to the beneficiary of
the release. For example, T devises a life estate to his wife, remainder
to his children; his wife releases her life estate two years after his
death. This is not a disclaimer because T's wife has accepted the bene-
fits for two years. Nonetheless, courts often use the terms loosely, and
the most common misuse seems to be callifig a release a disclaimer.
43
With respect to the issue of acceleration, the distinction between a
disclaimer and a release should not necessarily exist.4 However, in
39. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 233 (1936).
40. Acceleration issues may also arise if the life tenant conveys his interest to the
remaindermen. E.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 230 Ga. 493, 197 S.E.2d 731 (1973);
Schmucker v. Walker, 226 Va. 582, 311 S.E.2d 108 (1984). See, e.g., In re LeFranc's
Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 289, 239 P.2d 617 (1952) (the life tenant forfeits his interest by chal-
lenging the will when it includes a no-contest clause which is enforced against him);
Walter v. Thielke, 127 N.J. Eq. 402, 13 A.2d 649 (1940) (if the remainderman conveys his
interest to the life tenant).
41. By traditional usage, an heir renounces; a will beneficiary disclaims. Today the
two words are used interchangeably; they are considered synonymous. The term dis-
claimer is the one more commonly used to describe the formal refusal to take by either
as heir or as a beneficiary. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 15, at 123 n.16.
42. Id. at 122-27.
43. E.g., Smith v. Bank of Delaware, 43 Del. Ch. 124, 219 A.2d 576 (1966); Wein-
stein v. Mackey, 408 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Lefler v. Hoffman, 112 Ind.
App. 387, 44 N.E.2d 1022 (1942); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 54 Ohio St. 2d 26, 374
N.E.2d 415 (1978); Estate of Weeks, 485 Pa. 329, 402 A.2d 657 (1979); Goldstein v. Gold-
stein, 104 R.I. 284, 243 A.2d 914 (1968).
44. For some purposes, it makes a difference whether the transaction is a release or
[Vol. 42
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most of the cases in which the life tenant has released the interest, the
courts have refused to accelerate,'45 but in most of the cases in which
the life tenant has disclaimed the interest, the courts have accelerated
the interests. 46 At least two possible explanations exist for this distinc-
tion. One is that in the case of disclaimer, the courts rely on the dis-
claimer statute's provision that property passes as if the disclaimant
predeceased the testator.47 However, many disclaimer cases have accel-
erated the remainder without relying on such a provision." Another
a disclaimer. For example, the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust may disclaim but can-
not release their interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 comment 1 (1957).
45. Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A.2d 652 (1939); Lefler v.
Hoffman, 112 Ind. App. 387, 44 N.E.2d 1022 (1942); Ajax Electrothermic Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 7 N.J. 82, 80 A.2d 559 (1951); Walsh v. Hulse, 23 N.J. Super. 573, 93 A.2d
230 (1952); Trenton Banking Co. v. Hawley, 7 N.J. Super. 301, 70 A.2d 896 (1950); Law-
rence v. Westfield Trust Co., 1 N.J. Super 423, 61 A.2d 899 (1948); Keesler v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 256 N.C. 12, 122 S.E.2d 807 (1961); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 54
Ohio St. 2d 26, 374 N.E.2d 415 (1978); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 284, 243 A.2d 914
(1968); Compton v. Rixey's Ex'rs, 124 Va. 548, 98 S.E. 651 (1919).
"[I]t is generally held that the acceleration of the class gift by merger or forfeiture of
the life interest will not affect the size of the class. The class will increase in size until
the time when the life interest would have ended naturally." 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY.§ 22.43, at 368 (J. Casner ed. 1952).
46. See, e.g., Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422 (1943);
Danz v. Danz, 373 Ill. 482, 488-89, 26 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1940); Hasemeier v. Welke, 309
Ill. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923); Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941); Keen v.
Brooks, 186 Md. 543, 546, 47 A.2d 67, 68 (1946); Commerce Trust Co. v. Fast, 396
S.W.2d 683, 687 (Mo. 1965); In re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 399, 329 N.W.2d 842, 854
(1983); Estate of Paine, 103 Misc. 2d 393, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1980); In re Will of Dela-
van, 95 Misc. 2d 540, 542, 408 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213-14 (1978); In re Estate of Jacobs, 92
Misc. 2d 617, 618, 401 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (1977); In re Estate of Chadbourne, 92 Misc. 2d
648, 651, 401 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1977); In re Will of Carson, 58 Misc. 2d 819, 821, 296
N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (1968); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N.C. 166, 169, 84
S.E.2d 642, 644 (1954); Blackwood v. Blackwood, 237 N.C. 726, 76 S.E.2d 122 (1953);
Union Nat'l Bank v. Easterby, 236 N.C. 599, 602, 73 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1952); Central
Nat'l Bank v. Eells, 5 Ohio Misc. 187, 215 N.E.2d 77 (1965); Funkhouser v. Dorfmeier, 31
Ohio Op. 2d 42, 47, 202 N.E.2d 226, 230 (1963); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539,
542, 166 P.2d 417, 418 (1946); Palmer v. White, 100 Or. App. 36, 40, 784 P.2d 449, 451
(1989); Pate v. Ford, 297 S.C. 294, 297-98, 376 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1989); Clark v. Board of
Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tenn. 1980); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 332, 241
S.W.2d 415, 417 (1951); In re Estate of Reynolds, 39 Wis. 2d 155, 158, 158 N.W.2d 328,
329 (1968); In re Muskat's Will, 224 Wis. 245, 271 N.W. 837, 838 (1937).
47. See, e.g., In re Will of Delavan, 95 Misc. 2d 540, 541, 408 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213
(1978); In re Estate of Chadbourne, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 651, 401 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1977);
In re Estate of Jacobs, 92 Misc. 2d 617, 618, 401 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (1977); Funkhouser v.
Dorfmeier, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 42, 202 N.E.2d 226 (1963); Pate v. Ford, 297 S.C. 294, 297,
376 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1989).
48. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422 (1943); Danz
v. Danz, 373 Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940); Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N.E.
176 (1923); Keen v. Brooks, 186 Md. 543, 47 A.2d 67 (1946); Commerce Trust Co. v. Fast,
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possible explanation is that in the case of a release the court may be
more likely to suspect that the person granting the release is manipu-
lating the identity of the remaindermen. This is because there are usu-
ally other reasons for a disclaimer, such as considerations other than
its effect on the remainder.
C. Spousal Dissents from the Will
In many acceleration cases, the life tenant who renounces is the
spouse of the testator, who is dissenting from the will. 49 In nearly all of
these cases the courts have accelerated the remainders. 50 Occasionally
courts simply rely on the dissent statute's provision that property
passes as if the spouse predeceased the testator.5 1 The courts often
396 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1965); In re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 329 N.W.2d 842 (1983);
Estate of Paine, 103 Misc. 2d 393, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1980) (N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.10 (McKinney 1967) did not apply retroactively to the case but the
court accelerated the remainder because acceleration would be consistent with testator's
intent); In re Will of Carson, 58 Misc. 2d 819, 296 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968); Blackwood v.
Blackwood, 237 N.C. 726, 76 S.E.2d 122 (1953); Central Nat'1 Bank v. Eells, 5 Ohio Misc.
187, 215 N.E.2d 77 (1965); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539, 166 P.2d 417 (1946);
Palmer v. White, 100 Or. App. 36, 784 P.2d 449 (1989); Clark v. Board of Trustees, 596
S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. 1980); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951); In
re Estate of Reynolds, 39 Wis. 2d 155, 158 N.W.2d 328 (1968).
49. In states that have adopted the "augmented estate" approach of the Uniform
Probate Code, the value of anything the spouse renounces is applied first to satisfy the
spouse's entitlement. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207, 8 U.L.. 86-87 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
This provision deters the spouse from renouncing. As a result, this aspect of the Uniform
Probate Code has been criticized because the spouse might prefer, but is effectively pre-
cluded from taking, an absolute interest rather than a life estate. See Volkmer, Spousal
Property Rights at Death: Re-evaluation of the Common Law Premises in Light of the
Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 95, 141-48 (1983-84).
50. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 77 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422 (1943); Danz
v. Danz, 373 111. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940); Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N.E.
176 (1923); Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941); Ward v. Ward, 153 Kan.
222, 109 P.2d 68 (1941); In re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 329 N.W.2d 842 (1983);
Askey v. Askey, 111 Neb. 406, 196 N.W. 891 (1923); Estate of Paine, 103 Misc. 2d 393,
425 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1980); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. McEwen, 241 N.C. 166, 84
S.E.2d 642 (1954); Blackwood v. Blackwood, 237 N.C. 726, 76 S.E.2d 122 (1953); Union
Nat'l Bank v. Easterby, 236 N.C. 599, 73 S.E.2d 541 (1952); Funkhouser v. Dorfmeier, 31
Ohio Op. 2d 42, 202 N.E.2d 226 (1963); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539, 166 P.2d
417 (1946); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951); Hamilton Nat'l
Bank v. Allred, 496 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); In re Muskat's Will, 224 Wis. 245,
271 N.W. 837 (1937).
51. See Funkhouser v. Dorfmeier, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 42, 202 N.E.2d 226 (1963). States
with right-to-dissent statutes which provide that the property passes as if the spouse
predeceased the testator include: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 907(a) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.211 (West 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /2 para. 2-8(c) (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1(d) (Burns 1989); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-208(a) (1974);
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hold, however, that the renunciation is equivalent to the spouse's death
even without the benefit of such a provision in the dissent statute.52 In
spousal dissent cases courts frequently state that acceleration gives ef-
fect to intent because the testator is presumed to know that the law
provides the surviving spouse with the right to dissent.5 3 Another pos-
sible explanation is that the life expectancy of a spouse is shorter than
that of the typical nonspouse disclaimant, who is usually a child of the
testator. Courts recognize, without expressly stating it, that when the
remaindermen are children their identity probably will not change.
In one of the few dissent cases in which the court refused to accel-
erate the remainder,54 the testator (7) devised property to his wife (W)
and daughter (D) for the life of his wife, then certain legacies to named
individuals and the rest to D, if living, otherwise to her children. W
renounced. The court refused to accelerate because the postponement
was for the benefit of W as well as D. The court reasoned that if the
legacies were paid prior to W's death, D would be deprived of the value
of her life estate. Therefore, acceleration would distort the gifts and be
contrary to T's intent. It would seem that if the legacies were dis-
counted to present value, D would not be deprived of anything by ac-
celeration because she was given the remainder after the legacies were
taken out. D's children suffered by acceleration because they would
have lost their remainder, which was contingent on D predeceasing
W.55
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.160(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2318(a) (1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39(D) (Anderson 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(2)
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-190(a) (Supp. 1990).
52. See, e.g., Tomb v. Bardo, 153 Kan. 766, 114 P.2d 320 (1941); Danz v. Danz, 373
Ill. 482, 26 N.E.2d 872 (1940); Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923); In
re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 329 N.W.2d 842 (1983); Blackwood v. Blackwood, 237
N.C. 726, 76 S.E.2d 122 (1953); Clark v. Board of Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tenn.
1980); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951); In re Muskat's Will,
224 Wis. 245, 271 N.W. 837 (1937).
53. See, e.g., In re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 400, 329 N.W.2d 842, 854 (1983);
Thomsen v. Thomsen, 196 Okla. 539, 543, 166 P.2d 417, 420 (1946); Clark v. Board of
Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tenn. 1980); Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 333, 241
S.W.2d 415, 418 (1951); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Allred, 496 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1972).
54. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kern, 346 Mo. 643, 142 S.W.2d 493 (1940).
55. This assumes that if the remainder had been accelerated, it would have become
indefeasible, which is the result in the overwhelming majority of cases in which remain-
ders have been accelerated.
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IV. ACCELERATING AND BECOMING INDEFEASIBLE VERSUS ACCELERATING
AND REMAINING DEFEASIBLE
One of the most significant shortcomings of the case law on accel-
eration has been the failure to separate the issue of defeasibility from
the issue of acceleration. It is possible for a remainder that is vested
subject to total or partial divestment to accelerate but remain defeasi-
ble. For example, if T devises property "to A for life, then to B, but if
B predeceases A, then to B's issue" and A disclaims, B's remainder
could be accelerated but remain subject to divestment. In the case of
real property, B would get possession and would have a defeasible fee,
which would be divested in favor of his issue if he predeceased A. Simi-
larly, a remainder that is vested subject to open could be accelerated
but remain subject to open. For example, if T devised property "to A
for life, then to A's children" and A disclaimed, the remainder could be
accelerated but remain subject to open or to partial divestment.
The overwhelming majority of cases that accelerate the remain-
ders, however, also hold that they become indefeasible,56 and courts
rarely even discuss the possibility that the remainder can remain de-
feasible or partially defeasible. In some cases, it seems that the possi-
bility was never suggested to or considered by the court.5 7 When defea-
sibility has been considered, it has not been fully understood. In
Weinstein v. Mackey"' the court discussed the practical problem of a
56. Exceptions exist. In Hasemeier v. Welke, 309 Ill. 460, 141 N.E. 176 (1923), T
devised all of his real and personal property to his wife "so long as she lives and at her
death to . . my children, or in case of their death, then to the heirs of their body." Id.
at 461, 141 N.E. at 177. T's wife renounced and the court held that the remainder would
accelerate but remain defeasible. In Neill v. Bach, 231 N.C. 391, 57 S.E.2d 385 (1950), T
devised real property to her daughter, D, for life "with the remainder in fee to her chil-
dren." Id. at 394, 57 S.E.2d at 387. At T's death D had two daughters, a five-year-old and
an eleven-year-old. D renounced. Five years later D's husband, as guardian of the chil-
dren, contracted to sell the property. The buyer refused to accept the deed claiming that
it did not convey the deed in fee simple. D's husband sued for specific performance. The
court held that D's renunciation had the effect of accelerating the remainder but that it
would remain subject to open "until the possibility of afterborn children is extinct by the
death of [D]." Id., 57 S.E.2d at 388. The court found that T's devise of the property to D
for the express purpose of providing a home for D was evidence of T's intent to keep the
class open. Id. at 394, 57 S.E.2d at 387. In Askey v. Askey, 111 Neb. 406, 196 N.W. 891
(1923), T devised enough proceeds from his property to support his wife () for her life,
but if she remarried her interest was to cease; at her death the property was to be sold
and divided among T's grandchildren. W dissented from the will. The court held that
the class remained subject to open. Id. at 410, 196 N.W. at 893. The court noted that
although T realized that W's interest could terminate by remarriage, T nevertheless pro-
vided in his will that the grandchildren would not take until her death. Id.
57. See, e.g., Albright v. Albright, 192 Tenn. 326, 241 S.W.2d 415 (1951).
58. 408 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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remainder remaining defeasible if it is an interest in personal property:
If. . . [the rights of the contingent remaindermen] are protected by
sequestering or continuing the trust as to all or part of the assets (the
required proportion of which would be entirely speculative, since
there is no way of knowing how many more children Dr. Mackey may
have), there would be no real acceleration of the right to the principal
at all. In any event, this approach would engender a welter of uncer-
tainty which, as far as possible, the law of property should
discourage. 59
The Weinstein court and others have cited section 231 of the Restate-
ment of Property as authority for holding that remainders are indefea-
sible.60 The Restatement (Second) of Property also indicates that ac-
celerated remainders are indefeasible. 1
The Weinstein reasoning is wrong. Contrary to the point made by
the court, an interest that remains in trust to protect future remain-
dermen can be accelerated in a real sense even though it may not mean
an outright distribution of the corpus. The remainder, a future inter-
est, can be accelerated into a present interest by becoming an interest
in income until all the remaindermen have been identified. In the
meantime, the interests of those receiving income can remain defeasi-
ble or partially defeasible. This is acceleration in the real sense because
the interest becomes a present interest rather than remaining a future
interest. A life interest is a present interest even though it is simply a
right to periodic payments if it is an interest in intangible personal
property held in trust.62
In the case of an immediate gift of income to a class, the prevailing
view is that the class does not close immediately, but can remain open
to afterborn members because it is not administratively inconvenient
to keep the class open.63 Thus, if T transfers "$100,000 in trust to pay
income to the children of A for ten years, then corpus to B," the class
of A's children may, if A is alive, increase for ten years. The interests
of A's children are vested subject to partial divestment. Each time in-
come is paid out, it is divided into as many shares as there are children
59. Id. at 852 n.4.
60. See, e.g., Keen v. Brooks, 186 Md. 543, 546-47, 47 A.2d 67, 69 (1946); Com-
merce Trust Co. v. Fast, 396 S.W.2d 683, 688-89 (Mo. 1965); Cavers v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 531 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); In re Trust of Criss, 213 Neb. 379, 399,
329 N.W.2d 842, 853 (1983); Pate v. Ford, 297 S.C. 294, 298, 376 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1989).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 26.1 comment j, illustration 13, § 26.2
comment i, illustration 6 (1988).
62. The remaindermen would hold, in effect, a life estate pur autre vie; that is, a
life estate is measured by the life of another.
63. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
144 (2d ed. 1984).
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of A at that time.
When a life tenant disclaims, the remainder can accelerate and be-
come a present interest in income during the life of the disclaimant.
But it can remain defeasible or subject to open just as if it had initially
been a present interest as in the example above. The assumption that
acceleration necessarily results in indefeasibility contradicts the pre-
vailing view that in the case of a present gift of income, the class can
remain open. An erroneous assumption exists that acceleration means
an outright distribution of corpus. Once it is recognized that there can
be acceleration without an outright distribution of corpus, it should
follow that the accelerated interest can remain defeasible or partially
defeasible.
Cases that purport to deny acceleration because the remainder is
contingent sometimes reach the same result that would have been
reached had the language expressed a condition subsequent; the re-
mainder would have been accelerated but remained defeasible or par-
tially defeasible. For example, assume that T devises property in trust
"to A for life, then to A's surviving issue." A is to receive the income
during his life and at his death the corpus is to be distributed to A's
surviving issue. If A disclaims, a court might hold that the remainder
cannot be accelerated because it is contingent and the identity of the
remaindermen cannot be ascertained."4 But if the property remains in
trust and the income is paid to those who are entitled to the next suc-
cessive interest, the same practical result is reached as if the remainder
had been accelerated but remained defeasible."1 Each time income is
paid out, it is paid to those who are A's issue at the time. When A dies
the corpus is paid to the issue of A who survive.
If the devise is worded as a condition subsequent, but in substance
has the same effect as a condition precedent, the remainder could be
accelerated yet remain defeasible. This would reach the same practical
effect as the illustration stated above. Thus, if T devised property "to
A for life, then to A's children, the issue of any deceased child to take
the parent's share,"6 and A disclaimed, the remainder could accelerate
but remain defeasible. This could be achieved by putting the property
in trust (or keeping it there) and paying the income to whomever hap-
pens to be A's issue at the time. At A's death, the corpus would be
64. See, e.g., Aberg v. First Nat'l Bank, 450 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
65. Paying the income to those who are presumptively entitled to the next eventual
estate is not the only possibility. The income could revert or accumulate. For a discus-
sion of these choices, see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
66. This language is different substantively from the language in the hypothetical
in the previous paragraph in one way. If children of A predeceases A without issue, they
will not be divested of their interest. In re Houston's Estate, 414 Pa. 579, 201 A.2d 592
(1964).
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distributed to A's children and the issue of any deceased children. Al-
lowing the accelerated interest to remain defeasible prevents the life
tenant from being able to manipulate the identity of the remainder-
men. This preserves T's plan for distribution.
In short, indefeasibility is neither a necessary, nor desirable, con-
sequence of acceleration. A simple example illustrates the efficacy of
acceleration without indefeasibility. Assume T devises Blackacre "to A
for life, then to A's children." If A disclaims, A's children could get
possession, but their interest would be subject to open; they could be
partially divested by the birth of other children of A. They would have,
in effect, a life estate pur autre vie measured by the life of A, in addi-
tion to a vested remainder.
Now assume that the property is intangible personal property,
rather than real property, and A disclaims. The income could be dis-
tributed to A's children who are alive at the time; the corpus would be
distributed to them at A's death. Giving them an interest in the in-
come during A's life is equivalent to a possessory interest in real prop-
erty. In other words, either way their interest is present, not future. In
the case of real property, it is present possession; in the case of intangi-
ble personal property, it is the right to periodic payments of income.
A court may purport to deny acceleration because of the concern
for the identity of the remaindermen, but give the income in the
meantime to the remaindermen. This is not refusal to accelerate. If the
remaindermen are given the income, their future interest has been ac-
celerated into a present interest. In short, acceleration does not neces-
sarily require an outright distribution of corpus.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ACCELERATION TO THE DESTRUCTIBILITY
RULE
A. Statutes That -Abolish the Destructibility Rule and Their Effect
on Acceleration Cases
The archaic and nearly extinct destructibility rule provides that if
a life tenancy ends before the contingency is resolved, the contingent
remainder is destroyed.67 For example if T devises property "to A for
life, then to B if B attains 21," and if A died when B was 18, B's con-
tingent remainder would be destroyed and the property would become
possessory in the reversioner. If the life tenant disclaims, B has an ex-
ecutory interest because the disclaimer relates back. This means that
the life estate never existed; therefore the remainder never existed. B's
executory interest is preserved because the destructibility rule does not
67. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 63, at 78.
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apply to executory interests.6 8
The destructibility rule has been abolished in most jurisdictions.6 9
In some jurisdictions in which it has been abolished legislatively,
courts have prevented acceleration by applying the statute literally,
even though this was not the intent of the statute. For example, in In
re Lefranc's Estate,7 0 T devised the residue of her estate in trust "to A
for life, then to the issue of A and if A dies without issue to B if living,
and if not, to the issue of B." After A challenged the will, the court
enforced a no-contest clause against her, which resulted in the forfei-
ture of her life estate. A was forty-eight years old and childless. The
court said that the contingent interests of B's children could not be
defeated by A's forfeiture of her interest.7 1 The court relied on a Cali-
fornia statute and refused to distribute the corpus to B. The statute
stated:
No future interest, valid in its creation, is defeated by the determina-
tion of the precedefit interest before the happening of the contingency
on which the future interest is limited to take effect; but should such
contingency afterwards happen, the future interest takes effect in the
same manner and to the same extent as if the precedent interest had
continued to the same period.
7 2
It is doubtful that the purpose of the statute was to prevent accel-
eration even though a literal reading seems to warrant that result. If
the statute had been worded less broadly by referring to "remainder"
rather than "future interest," the no-acceleration result could have
been avoided more easily. The statute would not have applied because
the future interests could have been called executory interests.
Although Lefranc involved an unintended application of the stat-
ute, the result it reached is not objectionable. It provides another illus-
tration of a case in which the real objection is not to acceleration, but
rather to early indefeasibility. This is because the court applied an-
other statute that required the income be paid to B.7 3 Thus, B's inter-
68. Pells v. Brown, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620), established the inapplicability of the
destructibility rule to executory interests. See 0. BROWI6ER & L. WAGGONER, supra note
11, at 49.
69. 0. BROWDER & L. WAGGONER, supra note 11, at 126.
70. 38 Cal. 2d 289, 239 P.2d 617 (1952). See also Estate of Hoiby, 150 Cal. App. 3d
233, 197 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1983) (future interests of remaindermen who are to take trust
property on the death of a life beneficiary cannot be accelerated by an event other than
death of the life tenant).
71. In re Lefranc's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d at 297, 239 P.2d at 622.
72. CAL. Civ. CODE § 742 (West 1990).
73. California Civil Code § 733 states that the income "belongs to the persons pre-
sumptively entitled to the next eventual interest." Id. § 733.
A similar New York statute states that, "When income is not disposed of and no
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est became a present interest instead of a future interest. This ruling
also allowed for the future identification of the remaindermen as T had
intended.
B. A Return to the Destructibility Rule?
One of the reasons the destructibility rule has been denounced is
because it enables the life tenant and the reversioner to collude and
destroy the contingent remainders. For example, if 0 conveyed Black-
acre "to A for life, then to the children of A who survive A," later 0
and A could agree that one would convey his or her interest to the
other. This would merge the life estate with the reversion and destroy
the contingent remainder.
74
Ironically, the accelerate-and-become-indefeasible result that the
disclaimer statutes seem to mandate brings us back to a kind of de-
structibility rule. For example, assume T devises property "to A for
life, then to A's children, the issue of any deceased children to take the
parent's share." Assume also that A has two children, B and C, and
several grandchildren who are children of B and C. A might strike a
deal with B and C to disclaim his interest. B's and C's remainders
would accelerate and become indefeasible, thus "destroying" the inter-
est of the grandchildren. Although technically different from tradi-
tional destructibility, because executory interests rather than contin-
gent remainders are destroyed here, the result is still that the life
tenant and the holder of the successive interest can eliminate contin-
gent future interests owned by others.
Of course, a court might reach this result in a context other than
disclaimer when the destructibility cannot be blamed on the disclaimer
statute. In Walter v. Thielke,7 5 T devised the residue of his estate in
trust for the benefit of his wife (W) and son (S) for their lives, then to
four named individuals. If any of the four died before W or S, that
share would go to his or her children. Four years after T's death the
four remaindermen conveyed their interests to W and S in exchange
for two thousand dollars each. W and S then released their life estates.
The court held that the remainders accelerated and became indefeasi-
ble in W and S, defeating any interest in the children of the four bene-
ficiaries.76 Although the court did not use the term "merger," the court
valid direction is given for its accumulation it passes to the persons presumptively enti-
tled to the next eventual estate." N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-2.3 (McKinney
1967).
74. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 63, at 85.
75. 127 N.J. Eq. 402, 13 A.2d 649 (1940).
76. The court referred to the children of the four beneficiaries as "contingent sub-
stitutionary remaindermen." Id. at 405, 13 A.2d at 651.
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reached the same result that the merger branch of the destructibility
rule would reach. That branch of the rule destroyed contingent re-
mainders whenever the life estate and the reversion came into the
hands of the same person.7
VI. THE TRUST TERMINATION CASES
Trust termination cases are often acceleration cases even though
the doctrine of acceleration is not mentioned by, or argued to, the
court. These cases are hard to reconcile with other acceleration cases.
This may be due, in part, to a lack of recognition of a distinct body of
law on acceleration. Because of this lack of recognition, many accelera-
tion cases are not recognized, or treated, as such. Acceleration may not
be recognized because often no disclaimer, conveyance, or release by
the life tenant is present. The owners of the successive interests simply
seek termination. But if a trust is terminated and the corpus is distrib-
uted to the owners of the (previously) successive interests according to
their respective values, then the owner of what originally was a future
interest gets possession of a share of the corpus, a present rather than
a future interest. This is acceleration.
In trust termination cases, courts usually follow the general trust
principle that a trust may be terminated if all the beneficiaries con-
sent, unless to do so would defeat a material purpose of the trust.7
Instead of an accelerate-and-become-indefeasible issue, the question in
trust termination cases is whether an early ascertainment of the iden-
tity of the remaindermen would defeat a material purpose of the trust.
Of course, in the case of an indefeasibly vested remainder, the
identity of the remaindermen is established at the time the interest is
created.79 Although any successive ownership is defeated by termina-
tion, generally this alone has not been considered a material purpose
that should prevent termination."0 Thus, if T devises property in trust
"for the benefit of A for life, then to B," A and B can compel termina-
77. 0. BROWDER & L. WAGGONER, supra note 11, at 47.
78. This is known as the Claflin Doctrine, which is derived from Claflin v. Claflin,
149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). See P. HASKELL, supra note 5, at 222-32.
79. If T devises property "to A for life, then to B," B has an indefeasibly vested
remainder. This means that if B predeceases A without having sold his remainder, it
passes to his successors in interest. Thus, the identity of the remaindermen is certain in
the sense that at A's death it will become possessory in B or B's successor in interest.
The identity of the remaindermen might be certain ("to A for life then to B and C"),
or even if not certain, the potential remaindermen might be certain ("to A for life, then
to B, but if B predeceases A, then to C"), or the potential remaindermen might not be
certain, because potential remaindermen might exist who are not born yet ("to A for life,
then to A's surviving descendants").
80. See P. HASKELL, supra note 5, at 226.
[Vol. 42
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/2
ACCELERATION OF REMAINDERS
tion. If terminated, A would receive a share of the corpus equal to the
value of his life estate determined actuarially, and B would receive the
rest.
If T devises property in trust "to A for life, then to B but if B
predeceases A, then to C," then A, B, and C could compel termination.
The value of B's remainder and C's executory interest, again, would be
determined actuarially. But A and B could not compel termination
against C's objection, even if A is ninety and B is twenty and in good
health. C is entitled to the chance that things will turn out differently
than the actuarial charts predict.
Furthermore, if A disclaims his life estate and the disclaimer stat-
ute provides that the property passes as if the disclaimant predeceased
the testator, C will argue that to deprive his remainder of the chance to
vest will defeat a material purpose of the trust. But here the material
purpose principle of trust law competes with the less flexible provision
in the disclaimer statute. If the latter prevails, C's interest is defeated
because B is deemed to have survived A. Although the cases go both
ways on this issue, if framed as a trust termination issue, the alterna-
tive beneficiaries have a better chance of prevailing."1
If a disclaimer is not involved, the alternative or substitute benefi-
ciaries are more likely to retain their interests. Assume T devises prop-
erty in trust "for the benefit of A for life, then to A's children, the
81. See Schwarzkopf v. American Heart Ass'n, 541 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); In re Estate of Ikuta, 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400 (1981); In re Estate of Morgan,
74 Ill. App. 3d 853, 393 N.E.2d 692 (1979), af'd, 82 Ill. 2d 26, 411 N.E.2d 213 (1980);
Blacque v. Kalman, 225 Minn. 258, 30 N.W.2d 599 (1948); Ajax Electrothermic Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 7 N.J. 82, 80 A.2d 559 (1951); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 54 Ohio St. 2d
26, 374 N.E.2d 415 (1978); National City Bank v. Ford, 36 Ohio Misc. 60, 299 N.E.2d 310
(1973); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977); Clayton v. Behle, 565
P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977); In re Estate of Brown, 148 Vt. 94, 528 A.2d 752 (1987);
Schmucker v. Walker, 226 Va. 582, 311 S.E.2d 108 (1984); Blackwell v. Virginia Trust
Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S.E.2d 301 (1941). But see Cavers v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 531
S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) -(T devised property in trust for the benefit of several
annuitants with the corpus to go to eight persons or their descendants upon the death of
the life annuitants. Paul, the last surviving annuitant, released his interest after ac-
cepting the benefits for fifty years. The court held that the trust could be terminated,
and it rejected the argument of the substituted takers that they should not lose their
chance of taking). See also Testamentary Trust of a Child, 153 Mont. 349, 457 P.2d 447
(1969) (trust's purpose was to pay income to S's wife, mother, sister, and son during
their lifetimes, but mother, sister, and wife were deceased. Son, whose life was last mea-
suring life for trust, had forfeited his right to receive income, and trust would be termi-
nated, although some beneficiaries did not consent); Estate of Weeks, 485 Pa. 329, 402
A.2d 657 (1979) (trust's purpose was to support testator's (7 widow and children and to
preserve the corpus for T's grandchildren. The trust was to terminate on the death of T's
last child. T's surviving daughters, each over 60, had renounced their interest in the trust
income. The court held that the facts were sufficient to permit unconditional termination
of the trust because the chance of the birth of additional beneficiaries was negligible).
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issue of any deceased child to take the parent's share." Assume also
that A has two children, B and C, and two grandchildren, X and Y,
who are children of B. If A conveys his interest to B and C, they may
argue that their remainder accelerates, becomes indefeasible, and thus
defeats the substitutionary gift to B's children. But in this case, the
disclaimer statute does not directly apply, and the guardian for the
born and unborn grandchildren can argue that termination would de-
feat a material purpose of the trust because the testator wanted the
ascertainment of the remaindermen to be deferred until the death of
A.
Thus, the court in Schmucker v. Walker82 refused to terminate a
trust because it affected the rights of unidentified remaindermen. The
testatrix, T, devised real property in trust for the benefit of her son, S,
for life, then for the benefit of her son's widow, W, for life or until her
remarriage, then to "their children or the issue of any deceased chil-
dren, per stirpes." Four years after S died, W conveyed her interest to
the remaindermen who then sought to terminate the trust. The court
refused and said:
[U]ntil the event occurs which will terminate the trust ([W's] death or
remarriage), it is not possible to ascertain precisely who will be in the
class of remaindermen contemplated by the testatrix. For example,
should one of [W's] children die leaving issue before [] either died
or remarried, the class of beneficiaries would open for such issue. Con-
sequently, a premature termination of the trust by the beneficiaries
could abridge the rights of undetermined parties.
83
Stated differently, if potential unborn remaindermen exist, their
consent to terminate the trust cannot be obtained. Thus, in Clayton v.
Behle8' the corpus was to be distributed to the issue of the life tenant.
The court held that the trust could not be terminated prior to the life
tenant's death because the ultimate beneficiaries could not be deter-
mined until then. 5
Similarly, in National Bank v. Ford,86 decided before the enact-
ment of Ohio's disclaimer statute, the court held that if the life tenant
disclaimed, the remainder to his heirs could not be accelerated because
the heirs could not be determined until his death.8 7 Ohio's subse-
quently enacted disclaimer statute would change this result because it
provides that unless expressly provided otherwise, the property passes
82. 226 Va. 582, 311 S.E.2d 108 (1984).
83. Id. at 586, 311 S.E.2d at 110.
84. 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977).
85. Id. at 1133.
86. 36 Ohio Misc. 60, 299 N.E.2d 310 (1973).
87. Id. at 65, 299 N.E.2d at 314.
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as if the disclaimant died before the effective date of the instrument. 88
This again illustrates the disclaimer statute's departure from the tradi-
tional protection of contingent remaindermen.
The life tenant can circumvent the resistance encountered in trust
termination cases, however, by fashioning the transaction as a dis-
claimer rather than a trust termination. Therefore, if the life tenant
desires to terminate the trust prior to the deadline for disclaimer, he
could disclaim, and the disclaimer statute would mandate termination.
This would effectively preclude the "material purpose" argument of
the alternative remaindermen.
The desire to terminate could originate with the primary remain-
dermen who want to prevent their remainders from failing. For exam-
ple, assume T devises property in trust "for the benefit of A for life,
then to A's children, the issue of any deceased child to take the par-
ent's share." Assume also that at T's death A has two children, B and
C, and two grandchildren, E and F, who are children of B and C.
Shortly after T's death, B and C might politely suggest to A that he
disclaim his life estate, perhaps in exchange for some small gift. 9
If the beneficiaries do not anticipate the benefits of this arrange-
ment in time to meet the deadline of the disclaimer statute, then A
might try to achieve the same result by conveying his interest to B and
C or by releasing his interest. Alternatively, A, B, and C might simply
seek termination, but as explained above, they have less chance of pre-
vailing because of the unascertained remaindermen and because the
disclaimer statute does not apply. Furthermore, as Schmucker illus-
trates, there is no guarantee that the conveyance technique will work
either.
A might not achieve his goal by releasing. There is a split of au-
thority, but most courts refuse to accelerate when the life tenant re-
leases." However, the Restatement (Second) of Property indicates
that the class should close when the interests merge, contrary to the
majority view."1 Illustration seven of section 26.2 provides:
0 transfers Blackacre by deed "to O's daughter D for life, then to D's
children in fee simple." Ten years after the transfer of Blackacre, D
transfers her interest to her two children, C1 and C2. Prior to such
transfer, under the controlling local law, C1 and C2 have a vested re-
mainder subject only to partial divestiture by the birth of more child-
88. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.60(G)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1989).
89. This arrangement is similar to what occurred under the merger branch of the
old destructibility rule discussed in the text accompanying note 74.
90. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 26.1 reporter's note 10, § 26.2 com-
ment i (1988).
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ren to D. The transfer of D's life estate to C1 and C2 causes it to
terminate if there is a merger. Any child of D that is conceived or
adopted after the merger is excluded from the class gift under the rule
of Subsection (1) of this section, in the absence of additional language
or circumstances that indicate otherwise.
92
Although this rule achieves the desired result of treating release
and disclaimer similarly, like the disclaimer statutes, it creates the pos-
sibility for early indefeasibility. This creates even more opportunities
for manipulation of the identity of the remaindermen. In other words,
on the issue of acceleration and indefeasibility, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) has chosen to treat release cases like disclaimer cases. It would
have been fairer to the remaindermen to retain the flexibility found in
traditional release cases, which did not automatically result in accelera-
tion and indefeasibility. 3
VII. CONCLUSION
Many deeds, wills, and trusts create successive interests in prop-
erty, with a class of remaindermen that often fluctuates. The class
might only increase (to A for life, then to A's children) or only decrease
(to A for life, then to my children who survive A) or even both increase
and decrease (to A for life, then to A's surviving issue). During the
course of the life estate, the identity of the remaindermen is deter-
mined by the births and deaths of the beneficiaries whose interests are
contingent on being born and sometimes on surviving the life tenant.
These contingencies often have the purpose and effect of keeping the
property in the family, and courts sometimes say that giving effect to
this intent is the preferred result.
9 4
If the life tenant renounces, the question of accelerating the re-
mainder arises. When remainders are accelerated and made indefeasi-
ble because of disclaimer or release, this acceleration almost always af-
fects the identity of the remaindermen. Only infrequently do courts
even note that the identity of the remaindermen becomes fixed,
whereas had there been no disclaimer, the remaindermen's identity
would have fluctuated, becoming fixed at a later time.
Perhaps courts are tacitly taking into consideration the ages of the
beneficiaries of the successive interests. If it is very likely that the
identity of the remaindermen will not change anyway because of their
respective life expectancies, a court would likely accelerate the remain-
92. Id. § 26.2 illustration 7.
93. See supra note 45 and text accompanying note 47.
94. See, e.g., Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 54 Ohio St. 2d 26, 31, 374 N.E.2d 415, 419
(1978).
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der and make it indefeasible. Courts are not explicit about this, how-
ever, and consequently, the acceleration cases are hard to reconcile.
Some patterns have emerged despite the inconsistencies. For ex-
ample, in most disclaimer cases courts have accelerated the remainders
and made them indefeasible. 5 An even higher percentage of spousal
dissent cases have resulted in acceleration and indefeasibility. 8 Courts
are more likely to accelerate in disclaimer cases than in release cases.
7
Courts are more likely to accelerate when the remainder is vested sub-
ject to divestment than when it is contingent, although the modern and
better view is to reject the technical classification because it is not
decisive.98
When remainders are accelerated they almost always become inde-
feasible. Courts rarely even discuss the possibility that they could ac-
celerate but remain defeasible or partially defeasible. The indefeasibil-
ity aspect of acceleration seems to have been self-perpetuating. The
first Restatement of Property made the accelerated remainder indefea-
sible; the case law followed the Restatement. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) has followed the case law rather than taking a fresh and more
enlightened approach based upon developed trust doctrine. Further-
more, and unfortunately, the Restatement (Second) seems to have ex-
tended the automatic accelerate-and-become-indefeasible result to re-
lease cases.99
The law of future interests, of which the doctrine of acceleration is
a part, evolved at a time when wealth was largely tied up in land. Some
of the concepts that are relevant to the acceleration issue, such as the
class-closing rules, are tailored to address the concerns of real property.
For example, if a class closes so that the interest becomes indefeasibly
vested, the land is more marketable. 00 However, it is often preferable
for a future interest to accelerate, but remain in or be put in trust
without becoming indefeasible. Less need generally exists today to
close a class because of the prevalence of trusts when it is not adminis-
tratively inconvenient to keep the class open. In fact, automatic inde-
feasibility upon acceleration is inconsistent with the prevailing view
that in the case of a present gift of income, the class does not close
immediately. 10 The disclaimer statutes applied literally, however, have
had the effect of early indefeasibility and this, in turn, creates the po-
95. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Estate of Paine, 103 Misc. 2d 393, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1980); Clark v.
Board of Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. 1980).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
100. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.42 (J. Casner ed. 1952).
101. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 63, at 144.
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tential for manipulation of the identity of the remaindermen by the
life tenant in a way that would be contrary to the testator's intent.
Courts that purport to object to acceleration are often, upon closer
examination, really objecting to early indefeasibility. Refusing to accel-
erate, but at the same time paying the income interest to the remain-
dermen although their identity fluctuates, is arguably not a refusal to
accelerate. If the income is paid to the remaindermen, then a future
interest has become a present interest simply because of the periodic
payments. In the meantime, the composition of the class of remainder-
men can fluctuate until the death of the life tenant who has dis-
claimed. At that point the class identity becomes fixed, which was in-
tended by the testator, and their interests become indefeasible. In the
case of personal property, the corpus would be distributed to them. In
the case of real property, they would own a fee simple absolute as ten-
ants in common.
Acceleration in the sense just described depends on paying the in-
come to the remaindermen. But it is not clear whether the income will
always be paid to the remaindermen. It will in jurisdictions with a stat-
ute like New York's, which provides that the income goes to those
"presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate."'1 2 However, other
possibilities exist.10 3 Without a statute like New York's, the income be-
longs to the residuary devisees, if any exist who are different from the
remaindermen. It could also be argued that the income belongs to the
testator's heirs because they own the reversion, which passed to them
by intestacy. If the interests are created by an inter vivos transfer, the
income arguably reverts to the transferor until the death of the life
tenant. 0 4 Finally, it would be possible for the income simply to
102. N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 9-2.3 (McKinney 1967). See also ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-240 (1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 733 (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.17(5) (West 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-6-3 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.104.040 (West 1987).
103. In some cases in which the courts refuse to accelerate, the opinion does not
indicate the disposition of the income in the meantime. See Hills v. Travelers Bank &
Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A.2d 652 (1939); Estate of Ikuta, 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400
(1981); Lefler v. Hoffman, 112 Ind. App. 387, 44 N.E.2d 1022 (1942); Ajax Electrothermic
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 7 N.J. 82, 80 A.2d 559 (1951); Walsh v. Hulse, 23 N.J. Super.
573, 93 A.2d 230 (1952); Trenton Banking Co. v. Hawley, 7 N.J. Super. 301, 70 A.2d 896
(1950); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 54 Ohio St. 2d 26, 374 N.E.2d 415 (1978); National
City Bank v. Ford, 36 Ohio Misc. 60, 299 N.E.2d 310 (1973); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 104
R.I. 284, 243 A.2d 914 (1968); Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S.E.2d 301
(1941); Compton v. Rixey's Ex'rs, 124 Va. 548, 98 S.E. 651 (1919).
104. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 412 comment c provides:
If the owner of property transfers it in trust for two or more persons in succes-
sion, and the prior interest fails, no resulting trust arises if the future interest
is accelerated. Thus, if a testator bequeaths property in trust to pay the in-
come to a designated person for life and on his death to pay the principal to a
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accumulate. 10 5
A sensible result that would in all likelihood effectuate the testa-
tor's intent, would be to give the income to the remaindermen. 1 6 They
are the ones the testator wanted to benefit after the life tenant. Thus,
when the life tenant renounces, it seems logical that the remaindermen
would be the testator's next choice. This is generally the rationale be-
hind the presumption in favor of acceleration. Distributing the income
to the current remaindermen is a compromise between an outright dis-
tribution of the corpus and giving it to the reversioner. Letting the
remainder remain defeasible or partially defeasible effectuates the tes-
tator's other purpose, to defer the ultimate identification of the re-
maindermen until the death of the life tenant or until the end of the
prior estate.
This approach would have the effect of preventing early termina-
tion of trusts which, at times, may frustrate the desires of the benefi-
ciaries. Trusts should not be prolonged unreasonably, however. If clear
and convincing evidence exists that the identity of the beneficiaries
would not change, a court should terminate the trust. Beneficiaries
who seek termination are aided because the trust termination cases re-
ject the conclusive presumption of lifetime fertility.
107
Several statutory steps also can be taken to remedy some of the
existing deficiencies. Legislatures can enact statutes providing that in
designated person, and if the life beneficiary disclaims, the principal ordinarily
becomes payable to the beneficiary in remainder. But if the identity of the
beneficiary in remainder cannot be ascertained until the death of the life bene-
ficiary, the principal is not payable until the death of the life beneficiary, and
during his lifetime a resulting trust exists for the estate of the testator. It is the
duty of the trustee to pay the income to the estate of the testator until the
death of the designated life beneficiary unless the testator has manifested a
different intention as to the disposition of the income.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 412 comment c (1959).
105. See 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 412.1, at 54 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1989).
106. Scott agrees:
Even though the accumulation would not be invalid, it may come nearer to the
probable intention of the testator to make current distributions of the income.
If so, the income will ordinarily be paid to those persons who are presump-
tively entitled as remaindermen, even though they might not take the remain-
der on the death of the life beneficiary.
Id. § 412.1, at 55.
For example, in the devise "to A for life, then to A's children," if A disclaims, the
income could be paid out periodically to A's children at the time of the payment. If A
has another child, the income will be divided into another share the next time it is paid
out. In the case of a devise "to A for life, then to A's heirs," the income would be paid
out to A's heirs as if A had died immediately before the payment of income, that is to
A's heirs apparent.
107. See Estate of Weeks, 485 Pa. 329, 402 A.2d 657 (1979). See also 4 A. ScoTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 340.1 (W. Fratcher 4th ed. 1989).
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the case of a disclaimer, release, conveyance, or other event that has
the effect of ending the life estate while the life tenant is alive, when
the identity of the remaindermen is to be ascertained at the death of
the life tenant, the property should be held in trust for the benefit of
the remaindermen. The statute also should specify that the income is
to be paid out from time to time to those who fit the identity of the
remaindermen at the time. This would apply to a remainder that is
contingent (to A for life, then to A's surviving children), vested subject
to open (to A for life, then to A's children), or vested subject to divest-
ment (to A for life, then to A's children, the issue of any deceased child
to take the parent's share). Additionally, disclaimer statutes should be
amended to make it clear that acceleration will not occur without
indefeasibility.
Short of a statutory remedy, courts should recognize that accelera-
tion does not necessarily mean an outright distribution of corpus that
requires indefeasibility. The better result is to give the income to the
current remaindermen and retain defeasibility until the death of the
disclaimant. This would both effectuate the donor's intent and prevent
the disclaimant from being able to manipulate the identity of the
remaindermen.
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